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The countries of Eastern Europe, and particularly the more devel 
oped ones—Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland—are undergoing 
three distinct but interrelated processes. The first is the process of tran 
sition, whereby the system of central planning and the ideologically- 
based primacy of social ownership of capital is replaced by a system 
where markets and market-based allocations of resources play a pri 
macy role and where private ownership of the means of production 
assumes a significant, if not at first predominant, role. In the long run, 
the success of this transition is the critical economic issue for the 
region. Short-term changes in output or economic welfare cannot mask 
either the shortcomings of the old economic system or the potential 
inherent in the market system. Nevertheless, the potential that markets 
and private property hold for the economic future of Eastern Europe 
will not be realized quickly or easily. A measure of economic knowl 
edge, wise governance, and policymaking and a political system that 
can maintain a balance between responsiveness to the popular will and 
political expediency are the least that will be needed.
The second economic process going on in Eastern Europe involves 
managing the short-term macroeconomic shocks to which the region is 
subject. Framing the proper responses to these shocks is first, for the
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rejection of Communism had much to do with its economic failures. 
Thus today's governments in Eastern Europe face a legacy of deterio 
rating economic conditions.
In Czechoslovakia and Hungary the past decade has yielded stag 
nant or deteriorating incomes, while in Poland the worsening of eco 
nomic performance has been, as Table 1 shows, more precipitous. Less 
easy to quantify but equally serious has been the worsening environ 
mental degradation of the region, the extent of which is evident even to 
the casual visitor and the effects of which have resulted in a dramatic 
decline in health for the region's populations. To these long-term 
trends are now added inflation and unemployment. Having put up with 
the empty economic promises of the Communist regimes for over 40 
years, and having experienced declining living standards for the past 
10 to 15 years people in these countries are impatient for palpable 
signs of economic progress. It is unlikely that they are willing to accept 
long-term solutions that call for greater sacrifice today in return for 
promises of a better, but distant, future. Thus, governments in the 
region have only a limited amount of political capital and limited room 
to maneuver. Policymakers must seek to produce concrete and visible 
gains in the short run without adopting policies that are expedient or 
simply benefit politically powerful groups at the expense of appropri 
ate long-run policies.
The third process is one of rejoining the world economy. The pattern 
of trade that emerged in the Communist era, emphasizing the role of 
the Soviet Union as the major trade partner of the Eastern European 
countries and, perhaps more perniciously, limiting economic competi 
tion from and with market economies, was a major source of the eco 
nomic shortcomings of the Eastern European economies. Thus, a 
redirection of trade toward the West offers both an injection of modern 
technology and know-how, as well as of competition and economic 
rationality that should benefit the countries of Eastern Europe. Unfor 
tunately, the potential benefits of this turn toward the West are being 
outweighed by the negative consequences of its abrupt and partly 
involuntary nature, which is the result of the collapse of the Soviet 
economy and of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
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(CMEA), the organization that facilitated trade among these countries. 
This collapse of trade has led both to a more drastic shift in trade pat 
terns and to a greater decline in the volume of trade of these countries 
than was desired. Moreover, the shift toward the West has occurred at a 
time when western economic growth has slowed, thus diminishing the 
short-term capacity of world markets to absorb the exports of Eastern 
Europe.
Table 1
Changes in Net Material Product in Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland, 1979-1989

















































SOURCE: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 
1989-1990. New York: United Nations, 1990.
These three processes interact with each other, often in ways that 
seem unpredictable to policymakers and that are not clearly understood 
by the population. Thus, if we are to have a clear view of Eastern 
Europe's current economic situation and a realistic appraisal of its 
future prospects, we need to disentangle the processes in order to 
understand how they are likely to influence Eastern Europe's economic 
future.
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The Economics and Politics of Transition
A transition from a socialist, centrally planned economy to a capital 
ist, market-oriented one requires the creation of markets and of the 
institutions that support and facilitate market processes; the privatiza 
tion or at least "de-etatization" of productive capital; and the creation 
of a set of mechanisms that will allow the government to maintain con 
trol over macroeconomic aggregates and to provide an appropriate 
level of public services without interfering excessively with microeco- 
nomic processes in the economy.
The Conceptual Issues of Creating Markets
One difficulty with creating markets is that freeing prices tends to 
create inflation, which may cause social backlash against reform or 
unleash an inflationary spiral that would destroy markets. In some 
countries, such as pre-1989 Poland, there was a severe macroeconomic 
disequilibrium, characterized by large cash holdings among the popu 
lation, a shortage of goods at existing and artificially low prices, and a 
large government deficit that continued to fuel the growth of the 
money supply. Even in countries such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
where there was less of an imbalance between the demand for and the 
supply of goods, the existing pattern of prices was badly distorted. 
Prices of food, housing, and energy were too low, largely the result of 
consumption and production subsidies.
Thus, the liberalization of prices would have two effects. The first 
would be to increase the general price level so as to reflect the existing 
monetary overhang. While such an increase, if matched by equal 
increases in real wages, acts largely to reduce the value of cash hoards, 
it nevertheless has important implications for the distribution of 
income because older or wealthier individuals, who have a greater 
stock of savings, lose at the expense of younger or poorer individuals. 
At the same time, it is not possible to tie all incomes to the price level, 
and thus pensioners and public servants, whose incomes are relatively 
inflexible in nominal terms, tend to be obvious victims of such a gen-
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eral price increase. The latter groups, along with other low-income 
individuals, are also especially vulnerable to the second effect of price 
liberalization, the change in relative prices that operates largely to raise 
the price of highly subsidized necessities such as food, clothing, and 
shelter. Since such goods make up a very large share of the budget of 
low-income consumers, price reform is seen as causing large and, from 
the standpoint of social justice, unacceptable changes in the distribu 
tion of income. Indeed, to the extent that the former low prices of con 
sumer goods were maintained by a combination of shortages, 
subsidies, and low wages, raising prices to unsubsidized market levels 
can be seen as replacing an invisible system of taxes with one that is 
visible and thus more unpopular.
Changes in prices will also alter the financial fortunes of many firms 
and of the workers employed by them. However, there are as yet no 
clear provisions for bankruptcy. It is true that laws on bankruptcy have 
been enacted in most Eastern European countries, but there have been 
few or no bankruptcies. In part, this is due to a misunderstanding of 
managerial incentives for declaring bankruptcy. Specifically, the East 
ern European bankruptcy legislation implicitly assumes that it will be 
the managers of loss-making firms who will declare their firms bank 
rupt. However, both to retain their jobs and because of unfailing human 
optimism, it is not the managers of loss-making firms who opt for 
bankruptcy, either in western market economies or in Eastern Europe. 
Instead, it is the creditors of the failing firm who force the bankruptcy, 
largely in an effort to obtain some part of the equity in the failing firm, 
so as to secure the loans they have made to the firm. Unfortunately, 
Eastern European enterprises, like the majority of state-owned firms in 
other countries, lack equity; they are financed largely by debt, and con 
sequently bankruptcy provides little prospect to creditors of obtaining 
assets that can cover any significant portion of their loans to the failing 
firm. Thus, like the managers of the failing firms, banks and other cred 
itors are forced to rely on optimism and to hope that debtor firms can 
return to profitability. As a consequence, the structure of production 
fails to adjust to price signals as rapidly as it should while, at the same
104 The Economic Transformation of Eastern Europe
time, the financial system is increasingly undermined by the accumu 
lated debt of unprofitable firms.
Finally, the creation of markets requires the creation of institutions 
such as commodities and stock exchanges and the enactment of busi 
ness and commercial laws. The complex task of creating this institu 
tional and legal infrastructure entails both conceptual and practical 
difficulties. On the one hand, it is argued that the most modern institu 
tional arrangements available in the West, and particularly in the Euro 
pean Community (EC), with which many Eastern European countries 
wish to align themselves, should be introduced as quickly as possible. 
The argument for this strategy is that it will provide institutions which, 
because of their modernity, will last a long time and provide a stable 
institutional framework for the development of the market. Moreover, 
institutions will facilitate trade and investment with the West due to 
their similarity to western laws and institutions. The pursuit of this 
strategy has led to some seemingly bizarre results. For example, the 
organization and high level of computerization envisioned in the legal 
framework creating a stock exchange in Poland ensure that it can han 
dle a volume of transactions comparable to the United States stock 
exchanges; yet the number of shareholders and the volume of stock 
currently bought and sold in Poland are such that they could be quite 
adequately transacted and recorded by means of the bookkeeping tech 
nology of the Victorian era.
This dichotomy between the most up-to-date laws and institutions 
and the primitive state of the market has led some economists to argue 
for a more evolutionary approach. They point out that institutions arise 
and disappear in response to the specific needs of their environment. 
Under a given set of economic conditions, a given institution will arise 
if it can provide a useful service at minimal resource cost, and the same 
institution will be cast aside when its services either are no longer 
needed or are provided more cheaply by some other institution. Thus, 
for example, at some volume of stock trades, an informal system of 
curb brokers, such as the precursor of the New York Stock Exchange, 
may be most efficient, while only with a higher volume of trades do a 
formal stock exchange and computerization make economic sense. In a
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more general sense, since the Eastern European economies differ from 
those of the West in more fundamental ways, such as the level of 
development, the degree of privatization, the size distribution of firms, 
and the extent of foreign ownership, it is argued that a more evolution 
ary approach permitting institutions appropriate to this environment to 
arise and compete for survival would make greater sense than would 
the wholesale importing of western institutions.
The drafting of laws has been characterized by a similar debate. 
Some argue that foreign laws, often those of EC countries, should sim 
ply be translated and enacted tout court. The difficulty is that there are 
insufficient legal scholars to translate the necessary laws so that law 
makers are forced to draft their own instead. In any case, most laws are 
rather simple frameworks that must be filled in through the accumula 
tion of precedents that arise as the courts apply the laws to concrete sit 
uations. This fact has led to efforts to revive the business codes 
existing in these countries during the inter-War period. The problem 
with this approach is that such codes are often outdated and thus do not 
apply to modern-day business practices or to modern technologies. 
Moreover, they differ from EC law and thus tend to create obstacles to 
trade between Eastern and Western Europe.
The Conceptual Issues of Privatization
Even more difficult from a conceptual point of view than the cre 
ation of markets is the privatization of state-owned property, which 
includes not only virtually all industrial enterprises, but also agricul 
tural and urban land, as well as commercial and residential buildings.
Privatizing this property involves difficult tradeoffs between three 
desiderata: equity, efficiency, and practicality. An equitable distribution 
of property would be one that was fair to the residents of the country. 
One element of fairness is that owners of property seized by the Com 
munist regime should be entitled to some form of restitution. While the 
notion of restitution seems quite reasonable, its implementation has 
been something of a political football. Thus, different types of prop 
erty, e.g., large vs. small firms, agricultural vs. urban land, as well as 
different property owners, e.g., those who emigrated vs. those who did
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not, foreign vs. domestic, those whose property was seized after the 
Communist takeover vs. those whose property was seized beforehand, 
most notably Jews whose property was seized during the Nazi occupa 
tion, have been treated differently by the legislation on restitution. 
There is also the problem that simply returning specific pieces of prop 
erty to owners after 40 years may either undercompensate them if, for 
example, their property has been run down, or overcompensate them if 
the state has made significant investments in the property over the past 
40 years. In general, small shops and houses have been the easiest to 
return to former owners. Industrial property is more problematic and 
agricultural land is likely to be the thorniest issue of all.
Once restitution has been carried out, it then remains to put the rest 
of the assets to be privatized into the hands of the public in a way that 
is equitable. It is generally agreed that distributional equity in this case 
means allocation that gives each citizen a relatively equal share of the 
value of assets to be privatized. One immediate obstacle to this is that 
it is impossible to value the assets being privatized with any degree of 
accuracy. Each firm, of course, has a book value, but in the distorted 
economic systems of Eastern Europe, even more than in market econo 
mies, the book value has little to do with the economic value of an 
asset. Thus, any privatization scheme, other than the cumbersome one 
giving each citizen an identical portfolio of assets being privatized, 
stands the chance of being rejected on grounds of ex ante inequality. 
Worse, once markets are introduced, the economic, rather than book 
keeping, values of the privatized firms will reveal themselves as share 
prices of profit-making firms rise and those of unprofitable firms sink. 
The result may be an exceptionally rapid, and therefore socially and 
politically unacceptable, redistribution of wealth from one that was ex 
ante relatively egalitarian to one that has become, ex post, quite 
unequal.
A major objective of privatization is to improve the efficiency of the 
firms. Under state ownership, firms were neither subject to the threat of 
bankruptcy nor induced to maximize profits. Rather, their managers 
pursued policies that sought to extract financial resources from the 
owner, the state, in return for fostering social objectives, such as high
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levels of employment or exports or the production of desired products, 
all of which tended to interfere with profit maximization. Since private 
owners, unlike the state, do not have "deep pockets," privatized firms 
will face the threat of bankruptcy. Moreover, private owners can be 
expected to exercise greater control over managerial objectives and 
performance. The difficulty with this theory of corporate governance, 
as the extensive literature on the separation of ownership and manage 
ment in the modern corporation teaches us, is that many owners, each 
with a relatively small stake in a corporation, have little incentive to 
monitor the behavior of managers and little possibility for mobilizing 
their fellow stockholders to take action to replace ineffective manag 
ers. Thus, what is required is some concentration of shares in the hands 
of one or more large shareholders to whom the benefits of monitoring 
managerial behavior exceed the costs and who can influence the selec 
tion of managers. Such a concentration of shares, however beneficial it 
may be from the standpoint of efficiency, of course is inconsistent with 
the broad and relatively egalitarian distribution of assets required by 
equity considerations. Moreover, large owners are also likely to 
attempt to utilize political pressure to protect their assets against the 
difficulties many firms will face during the transition process.
Finally, there are problems of timing. Privatization can come about 
partly from the bottom up, as small private businesses emerge and 
expand, but their ability to do so will surely depend on the existence of 
a "level playing field" between them and the large state-owned firms. 
Moreover, it will be a long time before such small businesses can grow 
to a size where they can take over large state-owned firms. Thus, it is 
the de-etatization of the existing industrial stock that will largely deter 
mine the pace of privatization. Therefore, putting the state-owned 
firms into private hands has to be done quickly, forcing a certain mea 
sure of arbitrariness and pragmatism into competition with the objec 
tives of equity and efficiency.
Given these competing objectives, it is not surprising that a rather 
disparate set of alternative proposals for privatization has appeared. 
Among the most radical privatization proposals to come forward is the 
so-called voucher scheme, in which every citizen would be given
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vouchers with some nominal value attached to them to be used to bid 
for shares of the firms being privatized. The scheme could be modified 
so that risk-averse voucher holders could obtain either fixed-interest 
securities or shares of mutual funds that would use the vouchers of the 
participants to purchase shares of the firms. Moreover, foreign inves 
tors could be accommodated, either by allowing them to buy stock at 
some premium over the price paid by residents, or by allowing them to 
bid for vouchers offered either by the state or by the citizens of the 
country.
The voucher scheme is attractive primarily because it provides for a 
quick and extensive privatization of state property while simulta 
neously establishing at least the relative values of firms, an excellent 
starting point for the creation of a viable stock market. The proposal is 
also appealing in terms of ex ante equity, since everyone starts off with 
the same number of vouchers. Ex post equity is less of a problem since 
it depends largely on the choices made by each individual regarding 
the allocation of his or her vouchers. Nevertheless, given the lack of 
any useful information about the economic performance or prospects 
of the firms being privatized, it can be argued that citizens are being 
forced to determine their future wealth on the basis of little more than 
an arbitrary game of chance. Finally, the voucher scheme is appealing 
because it creates a broadly based "people's capitalism," so that, with 
everyone a shareholder, there should be strong political and social sup 
port for an economic system based on markets and private property.
The shortcomings of the voucher scheme are equally clear. First, the 
broad shareholding that it implies means that shareholder monitoring 
of managerial performance will be weak, and managers will tend to be 
unresponsive to the objectives of the owners. Second, the distribution 
of wealth to the population is seen by critics of the voucher scheme as 
being inflationary since, with greater wealth, people will wish to con 
sume more.
A possible solution to the efficiency defects of the voucher scheme 
is to give the stock of the firms being privatized to holding companies, 
which would then be able to exercise effective oversight of managers. 
The public would receive shares in the holding companies. The use of
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holding companies also has serious shortcomings. It is possible that 
holding companies would collude with management of the firms they 
own, preferring to keep poorly performing firms afloat rather than 
making the difficult decision to close them down. Moreover, the power 
wielded by holding companies would be enormous and, in the end, the 
holding companies might well reproduce many of the shortcomings of 
the old Communist system, with state control practiced through the 
holding companies.
The alternative to the voucher scheme is a program of selling state- 
owned enterprises to the public. A state agency, possibly aided by for 
eign consultants and bankers, would establish a fair market value for 
state-owned firms and then sell its shares to the public, including possi 
bly to foreigners. The principal advantages are that the scheme is non- 
inflationary and, indeed, raises revenue for the government, and that 
large stockholders are likely to emerge, promoting enterprise effi 
ciency.
This approach has shortcomings in equity and practicality. If the 
shares are to be sold, then the wealthier members of society will 
emerge with the majority of the shares. Not only is this rather unegali- 
tarian, it also favors those who had high incomes under the former 
Communist regime. Since these individuals were often part of the old 
political and economic power structure, the sale of state-owned firms is 
often referred to as the "embourgeoisment" of the "nomenclature" 
(those appointed to high positions by the Communist party). Thus, the 
system not only fails to provide much equity, but appears to reward 
those who, to most people in Eastern Europe, least deserve it. A further 
problem is the role of foreigners who, because of the undervalued cur 
rencies of the Eastern European countries, and because of their access 
to international credit markets, can easily outspend the residents of 
these countries in bidding for firms being sold.
The scheme is also short on practicality. Firms put up for sale will 
be difficult to value, and the process of selling them will necessarily be 
time-consuming, meaning that privatization will be slow. In Hungary, 
the valuation of firms, especially those sold to foreigners, has become 
the object of bitter controversy, further slowing the process. The popu-
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lation of the Eastern European countries lack the liquid assets to buy 
shares in firms being privatized and, given the uncertain economic 




The change from plan to market also means that both the sources of 
government revenue and the size and nature of government expendi 
tures must change. Under the old system, the principal sources of reve 
nue were the turnover tax, a highly variegated set of levies on sales of 
consumer goods, and a set of levies on the assets and profits of enter 
prises. To move to a system of uniform sales or value-added taxes and 
of taxes on enterprise profits will, in a market environment, involve a 
good deal of uncertainty, not the least because neither consumption nor 
profits is likely to be predictable in a period of chaotic transformation. 
At the same time, a new system of income taxes must be introduced to 
equitably spread the tax burden to individuals who engage in private 
enterprise or who own large amounts of stock. What rates to set for 
these taxes, and what government revenues will be are difficult ques 
tions to answer given the lack of experience with a market economy.
There will be equal uncertainty on the expenditure side. While the 
state budget should no longer have to subsidize inefficient industries 
and the consumption of food and other consumer goods, new and more 
volatile claims on the government will appear. The creation and financ 
ing of a social safety net is critical, both to provide for those suffering 
from the new phenomenon of unemployment and to keep the incomes 
of pensioners and the poor from being overtaken by inflation.
In addition to uncertainties about the government's revenues and 
expenditures, policymakers will face uncertainty about the efficacy and 
impact of traditional tools of macroeconomic policy. Although changes 
in the money supply, interest rates, government expenditure and taxes, 
and the exchange rate will have some effect on aggregate economic 
activity, the magnitude of these effects cannot be predicted ex ante. In 
western economies, economists have had a long period of experience
The Economic Transformation of Eastern Europe 111
with these policy tools, which enables them to make some estimate of 
the impact of changes of policy on economic activity, although there is 
still considerable uncertainty and controversy about macroeconomic 
policy. This uncertainty will be considerably greater for Eastern Euro 
pean policymakers who must deal with much larger macroeconomic 
shocks using tools at whose precise effects they can only guess.
As these complex problems of transition and integration into the 
world economy are being worked out in the reforming countries, they 
have an impact on short-term economic developments and, simulta 
neously, the success of the transition measures is strongly affected by 
short-term economic developments. Thus, it is to the analysis of these 
short-term trends and their interaction with the transition measures that 
we now turn.
Macroeconomic Developments in Eastern Europe
In each of the three Eastern European countries undergoing the tran 
sition to capitalism, the transition measures have been to some extent 
limited by, but also have themselves strongly influenced, the macro- 
economic environment.
Czechoslovakia
Of the three Eastern European countries undergoing transition, 
Czechoslovakia was the least prepared intellectually to undertake such 
a step. Few people within or outside the country anticipated the rapid 
collapse of the government that occurred in the winter of 1989. The 
economy, while lacking dynamism, at least was not in the state of crisis 
that characterized neighboring Poland, and the Communist party 
showed few signs of concern. Moreover, Czechoslovak economists 
had been unable to openly discuss measures for even modest reform, 
much less for the transition from communism to capitalism. The 
regime installed in the wake of the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of the 
country had purged many of the leading reform economists, consign-
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ing some of them to manual labor, and those who remained in the pro 
fession clearly understood that economic reform was a politically 
sensitive subject best avoided by economists.
It is thus understandable that 1990 was a year of slow groping 
toward an acceptable reform package. Early in the year, two competing 
packages were put forward, one popularly associated with Valtr 
Komarek, the popular head of the Forecasting Institute of the Academy 
of Sciences and Deputy Prime Minister in the government that took 
power in the wake of the "Velvet Revolution," the other with Vaclav 
Klaus, the articulate if acerbic Finance Minister and self-proclaimed 
disciple of Milton Friedman. The conservatives who sided with 
Komarek preferred a slow transition process where a period of some 
eight to ten years would be required to implement structural changes 
that would eventually permit the freeing of prices. In these proposals, 
there also was some searching for a "third way," some means of com 
bining the social equity and egalitarianism of socialism with the effi 
ciency of the market, in part reflecting the slogan of the reformers of 
1968 who had sought to create "socialism with a human face." Privati 
zation was also to proceed relatively slowly, with state-owned enter 
prises gradually being sold off to domestic or foreign buyers.
The more radical proposals called for a more rapid elimination of 
price subsidies and the freeing of prices within four to five years, a 
much more rapid privatization accelerated by the use of a voucher 
scheme and a sharp devaluation of the Czechoslovak koruna in order to 
set the stage for its convertibility.
During the first half of 1990, progress on resolving the conflict 
between the conservatives and the radical reformers moved slowly, in 
large part because the political situation was dominated by the Civic 
Forum, an umbrella organization for all the groups who had opposed 
the Communists. In such a heterodox amalgam of views, compromise 
rather than choice was preferable, and thus hard decisions were often 
difficult to reach. Moreover, until the June 1990 elections, the rump 
Parliament was loathe to take any important policy measures. Since the 
parliamentary elections and the split of the Civic Forum, with a group 
headed by President Havel favoring more gradual and measured
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reform and the remainder siding with Vaclav Klaus, the reform has 
begun to move forward along the agenda set out by the radicals.
In the summer of 1990, food and energy subsidies were eliminated, 
leading to a sharp jump of more than 25 percent in prices for these 
items. This tended to squeeze the profits of firms dependent on energy 
inputs, since their output prices remained frozen. A further price liber 
alization was introduced in January 1991, leading to another surge of 
inflation, with food prices increasing by 30 percent in three weeks. 
Because the government is pursuing a strongly anti-inflationary policy, 
it is hoped that these are one-time price jumps rather than the precur 
sors of an inflationary spiral.
Privatization has also begun. Parliament passed a restitution law, 
which cleared the way for the so-called small privatization to begin. 
Under this program, retail and service establishments were auctioned 
off to the public. The auctions attracted a good deal of public interest 
and appear to have had the hoped-for result of improving the assort 
ment and quality of service in these establishments. Large privatiza 
tion, meaning privatization of large state-owned enterprises, will be 
carried out with the aid of a voucher scheme to promote a rapid and 
broad diffusion of ownership.
Finally, in 1991, the Czechoslovak koruna was made internally con 
vertible at a rate of 28 konma/$. The convertibility is somewhat limited 
in that Czechoslovak firms are required to turn their foreign exchange 
earnings in to the state bank, but it is a step toward the liberalization of 
the foreign trade regime.
The macroeconomic policy of the reforms has been as conservative 
as their transition program has been radical. This policy stance was 
dictated in part by the economic situation that the new regime inherited 
from the Communists: a relatively small overhang of money in the 
hands of the public, little external debt, and stable prices. These posi 
tive inheritances the reformers could not afford to squander, since pub 
lic opinion was clearly resistant to the outbreak of inflation at a level 
such as in neighboring Poland, or to a level of foreign debt that existed 
in both Poland and Hungary. Thus, the government ran in 1990, and is 
hoping to run in 1991, a budget surplus. The money supply has also
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remained stagnant, resulting in the lackluster macroeconomic perfor 
mance shown in Table 2.
Table 2 
Macroeconomic Indicators for Czechoslovakia, 1989-1991
Percent of Growth
1989 1990 1991
Net Material Product 0.7 -3.3 n.a.
Consumer Price Index 1.4 17.0 53.1
Employment 0.4 -2.7 n.a.
Nominal Wages 2.5 3.8 n.a.
SOURCE: Josef C. Brada, "The Economic Transition of Czechoslovakia From Plan to Market." 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Fall 1991).
With the government's economic policy locked into an anti-infla 
tionary posture, the level of output and employment in Czechoslovakia 
has been determined largely by the effects of the transition and by 
exogenous events. One outcome of the price reforms has been to create 
large fluctuations in consumer demand. In 1990, consumer demand 
was strong, as people sought to stock up on goods in anticipation of the 
price increases scheduled for January 1991. Then in January, consumer 
demand collapsed, because of both higher prices and consumer satia 
tion. With the government unable to intervene to stimulate demand, 
output, which had held relatively steady in 1990 thanks to the pur 
chases of consumers, plunged and industrial production fell sharply, as 
Table 3 clearly shows. Moreover, inflation has increased and unem 
ployment has started to become a serious problem, with the level of 
unemployment increasing from month to month as may be seen from 
Table 4.
Table 3
Monthly Industrial Production in Czechoslovakia, 1989-1991 
(1989=100)
J FMAMJ JASON D~
~1989 95 92 105 100 100 106 88 98 101 117108 96
1990 93 89 100 100 99 98 85 93 94 115 106 89
1991 89 84 80 79______________________________ 
SOURCE: Author's estimates from Tydenik Hospoddrskfch Novin, May 23,1991.
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In addition to the collapse of consumer demand, the collapse of 
exports to the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries 
could not be offset completely by strong consumer demand in 1990 
and not at all in 1991. The decline in Soviet demand for Czechoslovak 
exports was particularly serious in Slovakia, whose industries were 
heavily oriented toward the production of goods, including armaments, 
for the Soviet Union. The collapse of this trade has had a particularly 
severe impact on unemployment in Slovakia, exacerbating tense rela 
tions between Czechs and Slovaks.
Table 4
Monthly Increases in Unemployment in Czechoslovakia, 1990-1991
(In thousands)
JFMAMJJASOND
~~1990 ~- - TA 8.8 12.6 19.4 27.4 43.9 57.3 67.2 77.0 
1991 119.0 152.3 184.6 223.2 --------
SOURCE: T'ydenik Hospoddrskych Novin, May 23,1991.
It is, of course, too early to tell whether the economy can recover 
from the decline in output and the rapid increase in prices. Public opin 
ion polls and government statements both suggest that the country is 
bracing for difficult times ahead. With macroeconomic policy locked 
into a deflationary stance, there are few ways in which output growth 
can be generated through increased demand.
Hungary
Unlike Czechoslovakia, which had much to do to catch up with 
thinking about transformation and reform, Hungary was the leader of 
Eastern Europe both in the theory and application of the market to a 
socialist economy. However, hampered by both the caution of domes 
tic politicians and the limits to reform implicitly imposed by the Soviet 
Union, Hungary's road to the market, begun in 1968 with the introduc 
tion of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), has been a slow and 
tortuous one.
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On the positive side, relative prices were less distorted than in other 
Eastern European countries, the role of small-scale private enterprise 
in services and in industry was quite large, and the Hungarian econom 
ics profession was made up of a large number of well-trained individu 
als who were familiar with western economic theory and who had 
regular contacts with western economists.
On the other side of the ledger, the greater sophistication of Hungar 
ian bankers and economists did not help them to avoid incurring a for 
eign debt of over $20 billion, larger on a per capita basis than that of 
Poland. As a result, for the past 10 years, Hungary has had to follow a 
deflationary policy of limiting investment and output growth so as to 
restrain the demand for hard-currency imports. This led to a long-term 
stagnation of living standards and the servicing of Hungary's foreign 
debt has thus assumed such overwhelming importance that it virtually 
dictates macroeconomic policy.
Hungary has been following a policy of gradual and slow price 
adjustments and liberalizations since the introduction of the NEM in 
1968. Since price liberalizations generally mean price increases, the 
government has sought to offset the effects of inflation on poor people 
and pensioners by simultaneously raising minimum wages and pen 
sions, although this policy is constrained by the need to keep aggregate 
demand in check. Moreover, despite the long record of price liberaliza 
tion, the reformers have faced seriously distorted energy and raw mate 
rials prices as well as distortions in rents, some food prices, and a 
patchwork of firm-specific taxes and subsidies that hamper rational 
economic calculation. The Antal government has not had great success 
in attacking these distortions, its most humiliating setback occurring 
when a protest by Budapest taxi drivers forced the cancellation of a 60 
percent increase in gasoline prices.
Small privatization is well-advanced in Hungary, with private res 
taurants and retail outlets having been permitted for many years. More 
recently, private small-scale provision of services and even the manu 
facture of goods was permitted. Big privatization, the de-etatization of 
Hungary's large state-owned enterprises, is proceeding more slowly, 
reflecting the philosophy of the ruling Democratic Forum party. Priva-
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tization of large state-owned enterprises was allowed by the Transfor 
mation and Corporation Laws, which set out the terms under which a 
state-owned enterprise could be converted to a corporation whose 
stock would then be sold to domestic or foreign investors. This proved 
to be a most controversial measure leading to public outcry and scan 
dal. In some cases, managers and workers were alleged to have sold 
enterprises to themselves at artificially low prices; in other cases, man 
agers allegedly sold their firms to foreigners at low prices in order to 
ensure their, and their workers', job security. A State Property Agency 
was organized in early 1990 to regulate privatization and to eliminate 
abuses of the Transformation Act. However, its head resigned shortly 
after taking office as the result of controversy over the privatization of 
Ibusz, the state travel agency, whose shares were quoted on the Vienna 
stock exchange at a premium of 200 percent over their original offer 
price. The Property Agency plans an orderly sale of enterprises, but the 
pace envisioned is so slow that, for the next 10 years or so, the bulk of 
large enterprises will remain in state hands. Since the more viable firms 
will be sold first, the state will increasingly come to hold Hungary's 
industrial cripples, and whether the government budget can stand the 
fiscal drain and the political system the pressure that workers in these 
industries will exert remains to be seen.
The macroeconomic performance of the Hungarian economy 
reflects the dilemmas and vacillation of the government. The level of 
output continues to decline, especially in industry, and so does indus 
trial employment, as the figures in Table 5 indicate. To some extent in 
Hungary, as in the other two countries, these figures must be inter 
preted with some care. The existing statistical systems were conceived 
for a Communist economy where virtually all industrial activity took 
place in a relatively small number of large enterprises, and the report 
ing and compiling of production data for new, small private and coop 
erative businesses are in their infancy. Some estimate of the magnitude 
of this reporting gap in the case of Hungary can be gleaned from Note 
a in Table 5, which indicates how industrial production would have 
looked in 1990 had small businesses been more fully included in the 
measure of industrial output.
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Table 5
Macroeconomic Indicators for Hungary, 1988-1991 
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SOURCE: Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, Statistikai Havi Kdzlfyek, Budapest, 1991. 
a. Previous quarter = 100. 
b. Previous month = 100.
While industrial output is falling, inflation continues apace, creating 
a dilemma for the government In 1990, the Antal government intro 
duced a strict monetarist policy, which reduced bank lending to enter 
prises and slowed money growth. Nevertheless, inflation in 1990 was 
nearly 30 percent and the further elimination of subsidies planned for 
1991 led most Hungarian economists to predict a rate of inflation 
between 30 and 40 percent for that year. The government, however, 
abandoned its tight monetary policy in early 1991 in an effort to stimu 
late production, particularly in the export sector and among the more 
profitable firms. Despite this reversal of tight money policies, inflation 
in 1991 appears to be abating. At the same time, neither unemployment 
nor industrial production are showing signs of recovery. Thus, the gov 
ernment, because of an inability to gauge the impact of policy mea 
sures and the lag with which they affect the economy, is forced to 
choose between two options. One is to assume that tight monetary pol 
icy is ineffective and to opt for easy money with the potential danger of 
inflation and the potential gain of higher employment and output. 
Alternatively, current developments can be interpreted as showing that 
monetary policy can, with a certain lag, fight inflation and that some 
monetary restraint ought therefore to be retained while waiting for the 
positive effects of the relaxation of the ultra-tight money policy of 
1990 on production in the second half of 1991.
The Economic Transformation of Eastern Europe 119
How much of the fall in industrial production in Hungary is due to 
domestic policies and how much to external events is difficult to judge, 
although it would seem reasonable to assign much of the blame to the 
collapse of trade with the USSR and with the other socialist countries. 
This decline in trade has been particularly large and difficult to adjust 
to for Hungarian heavy industry. The curtailment of credit by Hungar 
ian banks, on the other hand, as in Czechoslovakia, has been a source 
of worry for managers. To a large extent, however, the worst effects of 
this policy on production have been mitigated by the expedience of 
firms delaying payments to their suppliers. While the long-term effects 
of such an expansion of interfirm credit can be catastrophic, such cred 
its do not appear to be the source of the current problems of Hungarian 
industry.
There are also some bright signs in the Hungarian economy. The 
private sector has been relatively dynamic, with a rapid growth of out 
put and employment that has as yet eluded official statistics. Moreover, 
unless Hungarian agriculture suffers either from excessive organiza 
tional change or a lack of industrial inputs, it too is capable of making 
a positive contribution to the growth of output and exports. Finally, 
Hungary has been especially successful in attracting major foreign 
investors: General Electric has purchased Tungsram, Hungary's light 
bulb manufacturer; General Motors has invested in the huge Raba fac 
tory; and other western investors are participating in Hungarian bank 
ing, electronics, and telecommunications. Nevertheless, the slide in 
domestic output must be arrested and, since the economy is likely to 
suffer shocks to aggregate demand as trade with the USSR continues to 
decline, the only means of reflating the economy appears to be a rapid 
reorientation of trade toward the West or a domestic reflation spear 
headed by foreign investment and consumer demand.
Poland
Poland is unique among the Eastern European countries in two 
ways. First, it entered upon its reform with a government that was per 
ceived to be in a strong position to bring about a radical reform 
because it had a mandate from the population to bring about order out
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of economic chaos. This mandate was based on the face that, prior to 
1990, the economy had been operating on a self-sustaining inflationary 
spiral. Due to low consumer prices, the government had to subsidize 
production, which led to a large government deficit This deficit was 
covered by printing money, leading to higher wages and costs, necessi 
tating higher subsidies for producers, and setting off another round of 
the spiral. As Table 6 indicates, in 1989, inflation was high by any stan 
dard, but sales, and therefore production, increased very little, with 
most of the increase in sales coming in anticipation of the freeing of 
prices in 1990.
Table 6
Macroeconomic Indicators for Poland, 1988-1991 
(Previous year or corresponding period in previous year= 100)
Average employment 
Average monthly wage 















112.7b 106.7b 104.5b 102.7b 102.7b 
70.3b 102.1b 106.0b 120.0b
SOURCE: Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Biuletin Statystyczny, Warzawa, 1991. 
a. Previous quarter = 100. 
b. Previous month = 100.
This strong mandate and a perilous economic situation enabled the 
government to introduce a unique and radical freeing of prices in Janu 
ary 1990 that is popularly called the "big bang." Developed by the 
Deputy Prime Minister, L. Balcerowicz, the program freed prices 
while introducing strict controls over nominal wages. In view of the 
artificially low prices that had existed and of the huge overhang of 
unspent money in the hands of the population, prices of consumer 
goods almost doubled in January, but then inflation subsided to a rate 
of 5-10 percent per month, thus ending the hyperinflationary spiral.
This increase in prices, coupled with wage restraint, reduced both 
real incomes and private wealth held in the form of cash. As a result, 
consumer demand declined by over 20 percent. Polish firms responded 
to this decline in demand first by continuing production, some of
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which was used to rebuild stocks that had been exhausted by the buy 
ing splurge that occurred just prior to the freeing of prices. However, 
production for inventories could not continue forever and, with sales 
remaining at low levels, firms began to reduce production and to lay 
off workers. Table 7 shows the monthly evolution of unemployment in 
Poland, which continues to increase. Like Hungary, Poland has 
reached a point in the decline of output where some domestic or for 
eign source of reflation must be found to build on the positive results of 
the "big bang."
Table 7
Evolution of Unemployment in Poland, 1990-1991 
(Percent of economically active population unemployed)
J FMAMJ JASOND
1990 0.3 O8 L5 T9 2A 3A Is 455!o 55 5^9 oT~
1991 6.5 6.8 7.1 7.3 7.7 8.5 - 
SOURCE: Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Biuletin Statystyczny, Warszawa, 1991.
Among these positive results is the ending of high rates of inflation; 
indeed, as Table 6 indicated, the rate of inflation appears to be abating 
significantly in 1991. The creation of a rational price system in Poland 
is a further benefit, although it has not yet been fully utilized to guide a 
restructuring of Polish industry. Finally, the Polish zloty was made 
convertible at 9,500 zloty/$, and it has depreciated only slightly since 
January 1990. The cost of these gains in terms of lower living stan 
dards, unemployment and foregone production are, of course, quite 
high, and the defeat of the Mazowiecky government at the polls by 
Lech Walesa may reflect society's evaluation of these gains and losses, 
although Balcerowicz, the architect of the "big bang," has retained 
control over economic policy.
While the Polish government has acted to create markets in a radical 
and seemingly quite effective way, there has been much less progress 
on privatization. The broad outlines of the process are clear, but the 
final enabling legislation is not as yet in place. The Polish procedure is 
to mix equity with efficiency by combining sales of shares for cash 
with a voucher scheme. When a firm is privatized, the bulk of the
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shares will be sold, some to the public and a "core owner" who will 
own a large enough bloc to induce efficient monitoring of managers. 
Another bloc of shares, about 20 percent of the total, will be offered to 
the workers at preferential rates, and the remainder of the shares will 
be divided between the government and the Polish population, who 
will be given vouchers with which to obtain such shares. The strength 
of the procedure is that it provides for a broad and relatively egalitarian 
distribution of some of the stock of privatized firms with the concentra 
tion of shareholding needed for efficiency. The disadvantages are, first, 
the complexity of the scheme, which means that privatization will be a 
drawn-out process, and second, the coexistence of a variety of share 
holders who acquire their shares under different conditions and with 
possibly quite different objectives.
Conclusions
In all three countries, the principal objective factors leading to the 
decline in economic activity are the collapse of trade with the USSR 
and the effects of anticipated price changes on consumption. While 
there is little that governments in the region could do to avoid these 
shocks, the decline in production in the region has somewhat mistak 
enly been attributed to the process of economic reform. The major eco 
nomic danger facing Eastern Europe is that this mistake will lead 
policymakers to behave as if such declines are an inevitable aspect of 
reform and to delay the reflation of their economies, thus drawing out 
the hardships faced by the populations of the region and undermining 
popular support for the transformation to capitalism.
Integrating Eastern Europe into the World Economy
Sources of Pressure for Greater East-West Trade
The countries of Eastern Europe are being pushed and pulled into 
integrating themselves more closely into the international system of 
trade and finance. This is good news since, in the long run, such inte-
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gration will stimulate investment, rationalize these countries' econo 
mies, and foster technological progress. However, in the short run, the 
forced pace of integration is likely to prove costly as many painful 
readjustments will have to be made.
The push for increasing economic relations with the West comes 
largely from the disappearance of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA), which promoted trade among the socialist coun 
tries, and from the collapse of the Soviet Union, above all, and of the 
other economies of the region. The CMEA mechanism had maintained 
a high level of trade among the Eastern European economies and 
between them and the USSR. It maintained this high level of trade by 
means of mechanisms that facilitated trade among nonmarket econo 
mies, including a system of trade agreements that enabled CMEA 
members to negotiate exchanges of goods among themselves and an 
international payment system based on the transferable ruble. While 
this system had its shortcomings, and was quite cumbersome when 
compared to western trading arrangements such as the EC, it did facili 
tate trade among these countries, even if its promotion of intermember 
trade was based in part on the diversion of Eastern European trade 
away from the West
The CMEA mechanism no longer exists, in part due to the abolition 
of planning in the reforming Eastern European countries, which makes 
the government-negotiated trade agreements irrelevant. Moreover, in 
1990, the members of CMEA agreed that, from 1991 on, intra-CMEA 
trade would take place at world market prices rather than at prices 
negotiated bilaterally among members, and that trade transactions 
would be paid for in dollars and not by means of the CMEA's transfer 
able ruble. Thus, the two integrating mechanisms that bound the 
region's economies together, trade agreements and the transferable 
ruble system of clearing trade, were eliminated, and no new measures 
to maintain the level of intraregional trade have been brought forward 
to replace them.
In addition to the collapse of the CMEA, economic problems within 
the CMEA member countries have acted to reduce the volume of 
intraregional trade. The most important factor has been the economic
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collapse of the USSR. The Soviet Union is the largest trading partner 
for each of the Eastern European countries, exporting fuels and raw 
materials to them in return for machinery and consumer manufactures. 
Due to declining Soviet oil production and the Soviet need to divert oil 
exports to the West to repay debts and to pay for western goods, Soviet 
oil deliveries to Eastern Europe fell by some 20 percent in 1990 and 
will fall again, possibly by even more, in 1991. Moreover, the Soviet 
Union reformed its trading system, decentralizing foreign trade deci 
sions to individual firms, but these firms have no means of obtaining 
the currency needed to import from Eastern Europe. Thus, many large 
enterprises in Eastern Europe found themselves in a very difficult situ 
ation. Their supplies of energy and raw materials from the USSR were 
disappearing and Soviet customers, who had accounted for the bulk if 
not all of the output of these firms, were unable to purchase any goods. 
In 1990, trade with other CMEA countries and with the USSR was 
further hampered by the realization that outstanding debts in transfer 
able rubles would have to be repaid, after 1990, in convertible curren 
cies. Thus, some countries were eager to export, but not to import, in 
order to build transferable ruble claims against their neighbors, and 
subsequently to convert these into claims payable in hard currencies. 
Of course, with all the Eastern European countries seeking to increase 
exports to each other and simultaneously to decrease imports from 
each other, the result was a decline in intra-Eastern European trade. 
The Soviet Union continued to be wiling to import for transferable 
rubles, but its Eastern European partners did not want to accumulate 
large ruble claims against the USSR, fearing that both the difficulties 
faced by the USSR in paying western exporters and the political insta 
bility of the country would make eventual repayment of these claims 
highly uncertain. Thus, they unilaterally acted to reduce their exports 
to the USSR. Finally, the unification of Germany eliminated the Ger 
man Democratic Republic from intra-CMEA trade, a process that 
began well before unification took place as East German firms can 
celed trade contracts for imports, realizing that they needed to husband 
their money for the difficult period they would face after unification.
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The net effect of these forces is amply revealed by Table 8, which 
shows Polish trade cleared in transferable rubles and in dollars. The 
decline in ruble trade reflects both the physical decline in the volume 
of intraregional trade and its conversion from ruble to dollar clearing. 
Similarly, the expansion of dollar trade reflects both the increased vol 
ume of trade with the West and the greater use of hard currencies in 
intraregional trade. Despite the redirection of trade toward the West, 
the total trade of each of the countries of Eastern Europe has declined 
sharply in the past two years, with obvious effects on production and 
employment in the traditional export countries.
TableS
Polish Trade by Currency of Settlement, 1989-1991 



















































SOURCE: Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Biuletin Statystyczny, Warszawa, 1991.
While the collapse of intraregional trade has sent Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland searching for new markets in the West, such a 
westward turn has other, more positive motivation as well. The Eastern 
Europeans realize that much of their industrial technology and equip 
ment is obsolete. Thus, they view trade with the West as indispensable 
to raising the productivity and competitiveness of their economies and 
ultimately to improving their living standards. Moreover, the Eastern 
Europeans believe that they must act quickly to become an integral ele 
ment of the western economic system or they may lose their chance, if
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not forever, then for a long time. The closer integration of the Euro 
pean Community, scheduled for 1992, has had a powerful impact on 
Eastern Europe because Eastern Europeans want to become part of the 
EC. They see themselves as sharing a common cultural heritage with 
the peoples of the EC, and they are caught up with the "Euro-opti 
mism" that the 1992 program has engendered. At the same time, they 
believe that, as the forces let loose by EC-92 begin to integrate Western 
Europe more closely, it will become increasingly difficult for other 
countries to join. Thus, they believe that there is a narrow window of 
opportunity in which they must forge the economic links to the EC that 
will be the precursors to admission to full membership.
The Magnitude of the Restructuring 
of Eastern Europe's Trade
To understand what the difficulties of redirecting Eastern Europe's 
trade toward the West will be, we first must obtain a rough estimate of 
the volume and composition of the trade that is likely to be directed 
toward western markets. The CMEA accounted for about 8 percent of 
world trade. However, some 55 percent of the trade of the CMEA 
countries, or some 4 percent of world trade, was with each other. Due 
to the effects of CMEA integration, intraregional trade was some two 
to three times as high as it would have been had these countries not 
belonged to CMEA. Thus, the demise of the CMEA should reduce 
intraregional trade by about one-half, a volume of trade equal to 
slightly more than 2 percent of world trade. While the CMEA pro 
moted intraregional trade, the total trade of its members was not exces 
sively high, and it may be assumed that economic rationality would 
dictate that, rather than having their trade volume fall by 25 percent as 
the result of the demise of the CMEA, Eastern European countries 
would prefer to retain their present level of trade by redirecting trans 
actions to the world market.
Thus, the first question is whether the redirection of goods equal to 2 
percent of the world's international trade toward the world market 
would be feasible. Since world trade grew by 6-8 percent per year in 
the 1980s, it would seem that a further increase of 2 percent, especially
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if phased in over three to four years, would present few problems for 
international markets. However, once one moves beyond the aggregate 
and examines the commodity composition of the trade likely to be 
redirected, the problem appears to be more serious. Eastern Europe's 
exports to the USSR consisted largely of machinery and equipment. It 
is these export capacities in heavy industry that will have to seek new 
outlets in the West At the same time, Eastern European imports from 
the USSR consisted to a large extent of fuels and raw materials, often 
at artificially low prices. When one examines the existing exports of 
Eastern Europe to the West, it quickly becomes evident that they con 
sist largely of semi-fabricates and partially processed goods, not the 
machinery and equipment whose quality and technological levels, 
while suitable for the Soviet market, are unacceptable in the West. At 
the same time, imports of fuels and raw materials at world market 
prices will present a major inflationary shock for Eastern Europe.
The lack of competitiveness of Eastern European heavy industry on 
world markets means that policymakers in these countries face two 
choices. One of these is to attempt to make their heavy industry com 
petitive on world markets by importing western technology, equipment 
and technical and business know-how. This, however, would be a vast 
undertaking, could proceed only slowly, and, most likely, could be 
achieved only by granting a good deal of influence to foreign firms and 
expanding foreign direct investment. Such a strategy may face political 
resistance from populations unused to foreign owners and to being buf 
feted by the impersonal workings of the world markets.
The other way of expanding exports to the West would be to expand 
those industries whose products Eastern Europe has been able to sell 
on world markets. The difficulty with this strategy is that such products 
come primarily from low-wage, low-skill, and low-technology indus 
tries. To expand such industries would be costly in terms of the costs of 
moving labor and capital from other sectors, and it would be unpopular 
because it neither accords with people's expectations regarding 
progress nor provides for the type of high-wage employment that is 
available in heavy industry. Moreover, it is precisely agricultural and
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low-wage industrial products that face the greatest protectionist barri 
ers on western markets.
Thus, the redirection of trade is likely to entail significant short-term 
costs in terms of unemployment, the shutting down of uncompetitive 
industries, and the need to devalue currencies to make Eastern Euro 
pean products competitive on western markets. The investment climate 
in the region will be a major determinant of how much western invest 
ment will be willing to undertake the rehabilitation of the region's 
industrial structure.
Conclusions
This essay has stressed the interaction of short- and long-term forces 
on the economic performance of Eastern Europe. While the catalog of 
problems and challenges facing the region seems, and indeed is, daunt 
ing, there are also positive elements at work. The populations of these 
countries are reasonably well educated and cultural levels are rela 
tively high. People are hopeful of a better future, suggesting that they 
will respond to economic incentives. The most important issue for eco 
nomic policymaking is that policymakers are able to understand the 
disparate forces acting on the region and frame the correct policy 
responses. Without a sound policy framework, the challenges facing 
the region surely cannot be overcome.
